Technology Turns the Generational Clock
Is generational analysis legitimate? If so, what can we learn from it?
I think many of us are of two minds when it comes to thinking about American generations like Boomers or Millennials. We are certainly drawn in by the framing. It is bracing and engaging to hold forth on generational stereotypes. I’d wager many readers will have had or been party to recent conversations along these lines. We’re all liable to, at a moment’s notice, expound on whether the Greatest Generation was indeed the greatest or whether Gen Xers are really as disaffected as their association with Nirvana would suggest or what exactly is going on with Zoomer sartorial choices. However, I think this parlor game of ascribing known sociocultural trends to certain age groups of Americans also inspires knee-jerk skepticism. Isn’t it just an exercise in stereotyping and confirmation bias? Are these common notion actually providing anything of insight? Jean M. Twenge, a psychology professor at San Diego State University and expert in generational analysis, argues that generational analysis is as useful as any other type of age grouping.
In Generations: The Real Differences Between Gen Z, Millennials, Gen X, Boomers, and Silents―and What They Mean for America's Future, Twenge provides a data-forward perspective on the six major generations of the last two centuries that retain substantial membership: the Silents 1925-45, Baby Boomers 1946-64, Gen X 1965-79, Millennials 1980-94, Gen Z 1995-2012, and the current unnamed generation 2013-29 that she calls Polars. Each generation has a dedicated chapter, and this center of the book is flanked by a chapter that provides a justification for generational analysis (Chapter 1. The How and Why of Generations) and a chapter than speculates about future trends in the workplace, family formation, and politics. Segues between the generation chapters are often accomplished via discussion of major events and their fallout: the AIDS epidemic (Silent-to-Boomer transition), 9/11 (Boomer-to-Gen X), the Great Recession (Gen X-to-Millennial), and the COVID-19 Pandemic (Millennial-to-Gen Z).
By punctuating her generation chapters with major events, Twenge is nodding at the major event theory of generations, which was described by William Strauss and Neil Howe in their 1991 book of the same title, Generations. The Strauss and Howe theory also contends that there is a cyclical pattern to generations: idealist, reactive, civic, and adaptive. Despite seeing some merit in Strauss and Howe’s theory, Twenge argues that since WWII there is now a linear trajectory of generational differences driven by technology. This new trend overpowered the prior cyclical patterning.
The Case for Generational Analysis
Twenge makes a respectable and moderate case for generational analysis and generational differences. She presents a model in which technology is the root cause of generational change. However, she points out that it isn’t necessarily technology that mediates all changes directly. She highlights two important mediators that have been enabled by technological change: individualism (more focus on the individual self) and a slower life trajectory (taking longer to grow to adulthood, and longer to age). She also acknowledges that major events (also tending to be catalyzed by technology or natural changes) shape generational differences too.
Twenge argues that technology has made individualism possible by illustrating the effect of innovation on American society over the last century. Before the 20th century, the widespread lack of indoor plumbing, central heating, refrigeration, modern appliances, and international/transnational supply chains (and economic specialization broadly) largely yoked people to the homestead and encouraged close-knit smaller scale communities. In creating a middle class and scaling city populations, technological innovation helped individualism flourish. The trend of increasing individualism continued its march further due to the mid-to-late 20th and early 21st century technologies: television, internet, smartphones, and social media. Broadly, people have increasingly begun to critically consider questions of consumer choice, private ambition, identity, and politics. In the chart below, Twenge summarizes some major tech changes and their consequences. Notice how these changes sync with generational cutoffs.
Along similar lines technological changes have enabled slow-life strategies. The reduction of infant mortality along with advancements in modern medicine have extended life and youth. Moreover, economic specialization and advancement has increased the importance of extended education, keeping young adults out of the workforce longer and contributing to delays in family formation.
Twenge concedes that her model is not comprehensive, specifically highlighting her choice to ignore economic factors. She also cautions readers about how generational differences should be interpreted. She warns against applying generational qualities to any given individual in a generation. Totalizing claims will often be incorrect as people are complex, and there is plenty of overlap even among differentiating traits. Her claims are focused on average differences and understanding what may be causing those observed differences. Contrastingly, she also cautions readers against the “Not All [X] Are Like That” (NAXALT) fallacy, pointing out that outlier or tail effects don’t negate average differences. Plus, Twenge responds to the anticipated criticism that generational divisions are arbitrary. In response, she argues that most age-based classification can be considered arbitrary, and researchers make distinctions because they’re useful. To this latter point, the meat of the book is focused on presenting data that show socially relevant differences between the existing generational groups. This is often accomplished by comparing those of different generations along some metric while adjusting for age, i.e. trends are compared at the same life stage ideally unearthing generational effects.
Does Generational Analysis Explain Much?
Twenge presents a lot of interesting data about American generations. Generational cutoffs make sense in a number of ways, and Twenge’s books persuasively illustrates that there are certain characteristics and behaviors that do differ quite noticeably between these generations. However, there isn’t much in terms of causal weight to her claims and any number of confounder could be alleged. The technology model of generational change is compelling as a hypothesis but isn’t robustly substantiated by the data she presents. Twenge invests in describing the generational differences rather than connecting technological changes causally to those differences. The correlations are easy to see, but we all know that pesky old statistics adage: correlation does not equal causation. The claims presented generally lack any explanatory power because the work is mostly descriptive. This is fine for a book intended for lay readers. Furthermore, descriptive statistics are an important part of doing any science. We have to know what is happening before we know why it’s happening after-all. However, Twenge does tender certain causal claims that can be critiqued. These are mostly claims that are shared by her collaborator Jon Haidt, specifically the alleged relationship between smartphone/social media usage and poor mental health. Whether this relationship is real and/or meaningful is hotly debated (see Stuart Ritchie’s article or Chris Fergusons’ piece and the figure below).
Plus, the generational framing generally creates some important blindspots. Generations ignores important structural changes to America’s economy and related demographic changes (i.e. in-migration to booming cities and affinity-based sorting) that ratcheted up over the 20th century. Twenge does mention trends in income inequality and social stratification, especially between college-educated and non-college-educated Americans, but she doesn’t investigate how the consequences of these trends intersect with the generational differences presented. It would have been more interesting if Twenge leveraged available data from “natural experiments” or just presented more regressions or subset the presented data by various factors. Phenomena like the “Big Sort,” assortative mating, and cultural evolution are relevant to the trends described but are not considered.
Although I am ambivalent about the explanatory power of generations and some of the tenuous claims of causality made in the book (though Twenge is generally careful about this), I do think Twenge’s McLuhanesque model is interesting and worth ruminating on. There is something to the idea that when technologies like television and the internet began mediating social interaction, news consumptions and politics, cultural narratives, and aesthetic preferences that psychosocial dynamics would shift. And that they may shift dynamics differently for those that experiences this at different moments in their lives. In my reading of the data, it seems quite plain that traditional notions of social organization became increasingly tenuous in the eyes of young adults the more that media influenced and homogenized social expectations. Plus, this all occurred while other technologies increased the viability and availability of these alternatives. Moreover, it is also clear that the more various technologies and economic changes have atomized people and weakened social institutions, the harder it has been on the mental health and lifestyle choices of Americans. Do we need the framing of generations to glean this insight? I don’t really think so. Most of the generational differences are just the fairly predictable result of differences in immediate circumstances. The more surprisingly generational differences are the ones that are harder to explain persuasively. But at least generational analysis is an analytic reference that is easy to parse because it roughly corresponds with the development and reproductive cycles of humans.
Generational Highlights
Here, I have summarized in bulleted format, the traits that Twenge has highlighted for certain generations. A few of these traits and trends are unique to the generation, but a many of these highlights are shared cross-generationally. The differences then are just those of degree. This becomes pretty evident in her commentary on the mental health and the psychological trends of Millennials and Zoomers. I’ve inserted interesting stats, figures, and comments where appropriate.
Silents (born 1925-1945) - the “Good Times Generation”
Civil rights pioneers
Despite much of the credit being given to Boomers, civil rights reforms were mostly accomplished by Silents.
Early marriages and lots of kids
In 1956, the median age of first-time brides reached an all-time low (since 1900) of 20.1
Total fertility was 3.8 children per woman in 1957
More educated than preceding generations
By 1960, 64% of whites and 40% of blacks ages 25-29 had at least a high school degree.
Consistent political power and leadership
Elected at roughly the same rate as the Greatest generation to governorships and senate seats. The latter they’ve held onto for an extended period, but have been to some extent minimized politically by larger flanking generations.
Silents have conservative political beliefs relative to younger generations regardless of party affiliation
Characterized by stability and calm; generally better mental health than those before and after
Boomers (born 1946-1964) - the Demographically Dominant Generation
Self-focused - “the voyage to the interior” ~Tom Wolfe
increased variation in naming trends and other related language changes
Breaking traditional rules
liberalizing attitudes concerning pre-marital sex and homosexuality
Fewer kids, more divorce
Total fertility dropped below 2 during reproductive years
Increased comfort with drug use, extending well into later life
Influential political chameleons
Substantial but incomplete progress on race
Congressional black representation tracks with population proportionality today
Residential segregation index declined by 12% between 1980-2000
Between 1965-1970, poverty among black children declined 37%
The difference in white-black household income as of 2020 unchanged relative to 1960s despite absolute increases
Striving for gender equality
Women’s degree obtainment outpaces men’s degree obtainment in 1986 as last of Boomers turn 22.
Women’s labor force participation rate peaks in mid-to-late 90s
Sexual harassment becomes a political issue
Substantial rightward shift among aging Boomers outpaces expected age-effect rightward shift
Boomers dominate political office in recent past through today, especially governor houses and the presidency (Biden is first and only Silent generation president)
Social stratification takes off
Casualties of income inequality
More mental distress and depression
Gen X (born 1965-1979) - the “Middle-child Generation”
Analog and digital communicators
The last of the non-digital natives but young enough to adapt
Many big tech innovators
Socioculturally aware and upwardly mobile economically
Love of shared pop culture escapism
Good incomes contrary to their slacker image
Leaned into materialism and extrinsic values
High self-esteem moderated by skepticism, cynicism, toughness, and negativity
Independence, adaptability, and world-weariness
The rise and fall of the latchkey kid model
Flexibility in sex lives and family life
Shorter childhood but longer adolescence
More suicide as teens, stable mental health as adults
Political apathy
Reduced voter turnout
Some passion on environmental issues
Embraced pluralism - social acceptance of difference
Reagan generation - most Republican identified generation
Delayed leadership
Millennials (born 1980-1994) - Prodigal Sons and Daughters
Digital Natives
The smartphone went from introduction to more than 50% ownership in just 5.5 years
Psychosocial paradoxes
Self-confidence
Entitlement (for some)
Happy as teens but depressed as adults
Economic anxiety
Highly educated
Surprisingly high earners
Pervasive perceptions of poverty
Peter Pan Syndrome
Delaying committed relationships
Delaying or eschewing parenthood
Less sexually active
Politically participation
Liberal democrat and libertarian identified
Racially conscious
Less religious
Gen Z or Zoomers (born 1995 - 2012) - Unhappy TikTok Generation
Complete embrace of individualistic social culture mixed with safetyism
Increased LGBT identification (status marker of sorts)
1 out of 13 18- to 22-year-olds identify as nonbinary or transgender
Less sexually active
Greater delays in reaching adult milestones
Commitments to restriction of certain types of speech and expression
Online communication prioritized
Less physical activity and decreased physical health
Rampant mental distress and illness
increased suicide rate
increased depression
unhappiness and depression spiking especially among liberal Zoomers
Political polarization, increasingly along the lines of sex
increased political activism and voter turnout
Perceived discrimination looms large in Gen Z consciousness
Shaped by the pandemic
Polars (born 2013-2029) - the TBD Generation
First generation with a non-white majority
Their world is a less dangerous place
Lots of tablet use